Arkansas Civil War

A distressed Gen Albert S Johnston placed someone in direct charge of the Fort Donelson defenses, for the third time, by assigning Gen Gideon J Pillow to command on February 9th. Pillow spent the next few days correcting on site deficiencies by constructing earthworks, assigning newly arrived units and organizing a functioning supply system.

Among new arrivals was LT-Col Nathan B Forrest’s 3rd TN Cavalry. He was a former Memphis slave dealer and city councilman. This blacksmith’s son, and oldest of eight children, had no prior military service and used neither alcohol nor tobacco. His character flaws were gambling, fighting and cursing. He would go on to make a name for himself in this war of dynamic American personalities and tremendous ego’s.

On February 14, Flag Officer Andrew Foote moved his ironclad flotilla upstream and fired continuously to only observe again how vulnerable his monster gunboats were to plunging fire. Both the fleet commander and his flagship were taken out of action with the destruction of the armored vessel’s steering controls. The wounded naval officer ordered a withdrawal when another ironclad gunboat drifted downstream after being similarly disabled.

A political general named Floyd who arrived late and superseded Pillow, became convinced that Donelson was not defensible and decided to break out. Early on February 15th, the Confederates rushed the surprised enemy and drove them back, clearing an escape route to Nashville. Then inexplicably Pillow ordered a withdrawal back into the trenches. After regrouping, Grant had his men countercharge and regain the field.

That night a nonsensical council discussion concluded to surrender the strategic gateway to the South, but none of the top generals was willing to do the surrendering. That distasteful act fell to a junior ranking General, Simon B Buckner after Pillow and Floyd escaped by water.

Refusing to be surrendered, an enraged Col Forrest led away his cavalry and some infantry which distinction brought him to the public eye. But the Federal victory catapulted Gen Grant into national prominence and the northern newspapers couldn’t get enough of him. He proved himself a strategic thinker and he demonstrated excellent leadership. And to think, only a year ago he was clerking for his younger brother while employed in their father’s leather goods business.

Johnston had no grasp of the strategic plans of his adversary and never developed a streamlined plan of the defense for his department. He allowed a hazy command structure at Fort Donelson instead of appointing a competent subordinate. Despite his possession of sound field credentials, he was administratively hazy at the department level.

Northwest of Donelson, the Arkansas brigades of former Helena law partners, Col Patrick Cleburne and Gen Thomas Hindman, responded to Gen William Hardee’s orders to evacuate south from Bowling Green KY. They endured bitterly cold weather and arrived at Nashville (upriver from Donelson) to spend the day extinguishing a fire that engulfed a portion of the city. Col Forrest appeared and beat back a mob of looters with cavalry sabers to enable the transfer of valuable food and ordinance stores to the rail yard for south bound shipment. The former alderman later resorted to a gentler deterrent by taking a few fire hoses formerly used by the smoke begrimed Arkansans, to douse the unrelenting plunderers with ice-cold water. A day or two later, Hardee reached Murfreesboro where the Dixie Grays from AR County could recuperate with the rest of the exhausted Arkansans while the weather moderated

When he occupied Springfield, Gen Sam Curtis didn’t know if the MO Confederates were falling back toward AR or lurking south of town preparing for battle. But he purposefully concentrated on the fact his primary mission was to neutralize Price’s army.

With singularity of purpose the Federal army set out from the city on the morning of the 14th, in distressingly cold weather. First contact was made 30 miles southwest of town with slight skirmishing. Things later came to a head at Dunnigan’s farm, a day’s march into AR when Curtis’s vanguard careened back from a portion of Gen McCulloch’s army under Louisiana Col Lewis Hebert. An able assist was given by the 4th and 15 Ark infantry regiments and one MO Battery in a stout holding action. At 4PM Hebert disengaged from this first battle on AR soil. Both sides gave as well as they got, but Col Hebert seemed to have blunted his adversary’s enthusiasm to pursue while the Missourians at last encamped farther down into AR.

On a frigid February 10, Federal General Samuel R Curtis moved his Army of the Southwest from Lebanon MO toward Springfield. General Sterling Price, who had occupied the city long before, now called in all outlying troops from different points. He had sent numerous warnings southward about his opponent’s proximity but chose to remain in position till the last minute. He was under the impression he’d receive aid from AR when the weather improved.

On the 12th Price’s outer security was driven in with the pickets reporting the Federals advancing in force. Knowing he could not hope to win a battle against Curtis’s superior force, Price had no choice but to retreat and join the Confederate command in northwest AR. His retreat commenced on the night of the 12th on the main road to Fayetteville, by way of the old Wilson’s Creek battlefield. Curtis entered Springfield the next morning and raised the stars and stripes over the courthouse.

It was about this time General Van Dorn wrote the MO general promising to take only a portion of McCulloch’s force in his quest to seize St Louis. As a further indication of not being informed of the serious situation Price was in, he implied the latter should cooperate in a joint effort in moving against St Louis.

When the Union forces gained a foothold in TN with the collapse of Fort Henry, people all over AR were startled with the realization that the capture of the TN forts would open a dreaded highway of invasion down the Mississippi River. Across the state meetings were held for public discussion. These gatherings more then anything else exposed the reason many men had not already volunteered for military service; fear their families would not be properly cared for in their absence.

Newspapers got into the act by indulging in a great deal of advice as to what citizens should do in case of invasion. Planters were told to get ready to burn their cotton. Also suggestions were given to destroy food supplies at the last possible moment.

General Grant’s penetration of the mid-south with a combined land and water assault on both the TN and Cumberland Rivers was designed to outflank both Polk’s army at Columbus KY, and Gen William Hardees’s forces at Bowling Green. After taking the two river strongholds, a forceful thrust from there to the Mississippi state line would prompt the evacuation of both KY and TN. Thus Grant would complete his strategy of recovering two states. And he would do so without having to fight either opponent, as skillfully pointed out by authors Major Calvin L Collier and Floyd R Barnhill Jr. in their book, The Fighting Fifth.

At the fall of Fort Henry he wired his theater superior an exuberant message that ended optimistically with: “I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Henry”. He then asked Admiral Andrew H Foot to take the fleet back north on the TN river and into the Ohio for repairs at Cairo, then east to the Cumberland River where they would steam south to Fort Donelson. Land forces would slog across the inhospitable 12 mile strip that separated the two streams and take position around the stronghold.

The Department Commander of the upper south ranging from the Appalachians to the Mississippi, full general General Albert S Johnston, had to call in Generals Simon B Buckner and John B Floyd from as far away as Alabama. Their troop strength was needed to shore up the Cumberland River fort and accounted for the largest part of the approximately 15000 stalwarts in the trenches.

Among the Arkansas infantry regiments to serve at that fatal location were the Seventh and Twelfth regiments, and the evacuees of Col James M Gee’s Fifteenth.

It will be recalled from a previous column that St Louis was the base of operations for the upcoming river campaigns to seize control of Confederate positions. There were Southern troop concentrations between Nashville and Bowling Green KY, and the MS River. On the Mississippi there were heavy fortifications first at Columbus, then Island NO 10. Fort Henry was a short distance up the TN River and Fort Donelson was 12 miles away on the Cumberland. The latter two were in west TN near the KY border and were commanded by Brig Gen Lloyd Tilghman.

On January 30, Major General Henry W Halleck, commanding the Union Dept. of the Missouri authorized a land and Naval operation against Fort Henry, which had been proposed by Brig Gen U S Grant and endorsed by Flag Officer Andrew H Foote.

The expedition pushed off from the St Louis docks on February 2. The sharp end of the navy flotilla consisted of four ironclad behemoths built in St Louis and Cairo IL. The other three were old steamboat conversions without armor but all were essentially floating forts. Grant unloaded his first troops for encirclement four miles from Fort Henry on the 5th, and ordered the operation to begin at 11 o’clock next morning.

Gen Tilghman knew his few AR and AL regiments was no match to his opponents17000. On the 6th he decided to evacuate the stronghold and try to get his command to Fort Donelson, realizing he could not save Fort Henry, but that his troops might be able to save Fort Donelson. The evacuation began at once, leaving only a heavy artillery company to man the big guns and delay the fall of the fort as long as possible. No threat materialized from the land forces. A nighttime rainstorm made roads impassable and immobilized Grants long infantry columns like so many engorged serpents.

The attack came on fast and furious; one ironclad took a shot in the boiler and drifted downstream in a cloud of steam with 29 scalded sailors.

Inside the fort, a naval shell disabled two well served guns. Hours later the number of guns was reduced to four and the few remaining cannoneers were about to drop with exhaustion. Tilghman then assisted with one of the guns before surrendering.

The main body retreated to Fort Donelson in good order. However, in a rear guard skirmish, Major Benning of Colonel James M Gee’s 15th AR and an AL Captain were captured. All told 61 Confederates were casualties. Their opponents suffered 44 killed and wounded. Flag Officer Foote reported “Fort Henry was defended with the most determined gallantry by Gen Tilghman, worthy of a better cause.”

Major General Earl Van Dorn wasn’t in Little Rock long until he moved his HQ to Pocahontas and directed nearby AR units to that location. He also requested two infantry regiments from Texas to concentrate in that vicinity by March 1st. Additionally, on February 6, he ordered Gen McCulloch to move his infantry and mounted units there while informing General Sterling Price of postponing a visit to his Springfield location.

Van Dorn had an eye to seizing St Louis, but just now he thought his base of operations was being threatened by enemy forces.

By chance McCulloch had encountered Van Dorn at Little Rock a few days earlier and was informed of the latter’s plan to invade MO from northeast AR in the spring. On reaching Fort Smith McCulloch was notified by his officers that General Price at Springfield was having fits because a Federal concentration was boldly taking place at Lebanon, 50 miles to the northeast.

There was some foundation to his frantic behavior. Curtis decided to make that location his forward staging area on January 29, after an excruciating three day march from Waynesville. Here stockpiles of supplies would be warehoused to support the weary and dispiriting drive to Springfield.

Since Van Dorn wanted to shift his army to Pocahontas, McCulloch believed he had no authorization to march to Springfield to assist Price. After some contemplation that evolved into a surge of leadership, he concluded to take the responsibility to “unite with Price and win a battle”.

On the civilian front, the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company asked Congress to advance half a million dollars in Confederate bonds for completion of the “middle division” of the line. The company agreed to secure the advance with an equal amount of its own bonds, and also give whatever personal security might be approved by the Secretary of War. The estimated completion date was set for July 1st. The company pointed out the railroad was a military necessity and would save the Confederacy much time and money in transportation of troops and munitions of war to northeast AR and MO.

Two sections were already in operation. The eastern division from the Mississippi to Madison on the St Francis had been active during the past two years. The western division from DeValls Bluff on White River to Huntersville Station on the north side of the Arkansas was recently completed with ceremony.

The bridge on the St Francis River was finished and the heaviest part of the grading had been done. Also numerous crossties and enough iron for 15 miles of track had been brought to the section. Another 2500 tons of iron would be needed to complete the line. The rails were nearly impossible to buy, but the company officials thought they could obtain it from other railroads which had been forced to suspend construction after the war started. (Margaret Ross, Chronicles of Arkansas, Arkansas Gazette, February 1962)

Major General Earl Van Dorn arrived at Little Rock on the evening of January 28, and took a room at the luxurious Anthony House, the Capital city’s leading hotel. He was assigned by the Secretary of War to command the Trans-Mississippi District on January 10th, as previously stated.

The next day he issued his first general order by which he formally assumed the command. He then ordered all officers and men on furlough to return to their regiments. Immediately afterward he called upon Governor Rector for ten more companies of infantry and four artillery companies from Arkansas. In doing so, he inadvertently got the wholehearted co-operation of the governor by explaining the new troops would guard the state from invasion and assist in driving the enemy from MO. The governor like many others was displeased at the removal of Arkansas troops to Kentucky in ’61. But it proved to be a promise Van Dorn couldn’t keep. In three months he unforeseeably had to take them east of the Mississippi.

Among Van Dorn’s appointed staff officers were two Virginians, West Pointer’s with over 15 years service in the old army. Major William L Cabell was Chief of the Quartermaster Department. During the previous summer he served in that capacity for Gen Beauregard during the battle of Bull Run. He would later rise to prominence in Arkansas as a hell-for-leather cavalry general. Colonel Dabney H Maury graduated from the University of Virginia in 1842, studied law, but entered West Point (USMA) rather than establish a legal practice. When he resigned his commission in 1861, this Mexican War veteran and esteemed Military Academy instructor entered Confederate service as a captain of cavalry, but in early 1862 was promoted and assigned as Chief of Staff to Gen Van Dorn. Kentucky native and former cavalry captain William N R Beall was appointed to the USMA from Chicot County Arkansas in 1844. As with so many of the young officers of his day, his service was primarily on the frontier skirmishing with Indians or attending to Kansans border disturbances. He impressed Van Dorn as a man born to military life. The general would twice recommend Beal for a colonelcy. Instead Congress confirmed him as a Brigadier General on April 11, 1862.

The three men were aggressive to a mature level and provided an excellent nucleus to assist an army commander. It was probable President Davis was instrumental in furnishing these three professionals, but his friend Gen Van Dorn would demonstrate a need for a dynamic staff to stabilize his battlefield performance.

January 26, 1862 was a special day for Central Arkansas because the western section of the Memphis and Little Rock railroad was completed. Its terminal point was on the north side of the Arkansas River at Huntersville Station.

A brief ceremony took place 11 miles from that site with the honor of driving the last spike given to Mr. William E Woodruff of Little Rock, one of the directors of the railroad company and the oldest representative of the press in Arkansas, having founded the Arkansas Gazette in 1819. Then followed a short speech by Christopher C Danley, current editor of the newspaper who envisioned a larger circulation implemented through this mode of transportation. Soon the mail from Memphis would arrive seven hours earlier then usual. With trains leaving Huntersville every morning at eight o’clock, traveling time to Memphis would soon be reduced to 24 hours as opposed to normal 36 hours, which was surely encouraging to Mr. Danley.

Nine years had passed since the railroad had been chartered, yet there still remained a gap of 45 miles in the road between the White and St Francis Rivers. Even so the railroad was of great benefit, because it connected Little Rock and its environs with the White River at DeValls Bluff which unlike the Arkansas stayed navigable at all seasons.

President Abraham Lincoln was enduring the New Year with impatience and disdain from what he perceived as a serious lack of commitment from his top generals. He then issued Order No 1 setting February 22, Washington’s birthday, as the date when all US land and naval forces would move against Confederate positions.

St Louis was the third largest industrial city in the North and the base of operations for projected offensives on the Mississippi (Memphis), Tennessee (Nashville), and Cumberland Rivers (Forts Henry and Donelson). Every Federal soldier stationed in Missouri to counter Gen Price’s State Guard and protect St Louis was one less soldier that could be used in the upcoming river campaigns. (William L Shea & Earl J Hess, Pea Ridge Civil War Campaigns in the West, 1992)

In late December when Brig Gen Samuel R Curtis received command of the Military District of Southwest MO, he became excited about his new assignment and hastened to Rolla in south-central MO, to plan his campaign while organizing an army. He was a month ahead of Lincoln.

However, conducting a winter offensive begged more sober consideration. The existing logistical difficulty of moving an army southwest across the muddy Ozark Plateau from Rolla amid inclement weather, would be painfully distressing. Even without encountering an enemy, the loss of men, equipment and animals would be significant though not overwhelming. Finally, Gen Price had the option of falling back to northwest AR contesting the enemy’s advance at every strong point until reaching McCulloch’s force that were poised and eager for a fight.

These two men had been quarreling continuously for months over the correct way to run the war in their sector.

President Davis had no confidence in neither Price nor McCulloch because neither had a West Point education. When Gen Earl Van Dorn received command of the newly created Trans-Mississippi District on January 10, he quelled the controversy by combining the two armies and placing himself at the head.

No soldiers from Arkansas County were assigned near Northwest AR, but were bunkered down in Kentucky and Virginia, thinking about loved ones left behind.

County Court for the January term transacted business like the following;

Thetford Notrebe Vs. Arkansas County (War funds $84.70)

Now on this day was presented the claim of the said Notrebe against said court in the sum of Eighty four dollars & Seventy cents for articles furnished indigent families of volunteers who are gone to the war which claim was examined by the court and ordered paid out of the County war fund.

Notrebe was a twenty eight year old merchant in Old River Township and authorized to make claims for those considered indigent or improvident. Another claim against the county was made by a middle aged farmer representing LaGrue Township;

Lewis Thompson Vs.Arkansas County

Now on this day was presented the claim of the said Thompson against the said county for the sum of twelve dollars for one sack of salt furnished indigent families whose men are in actual service. Said claim was examined by the court and ordered paid out of the county war funds.

A claim of $30.13 for provisions was made by W R Hagler, likely from Villemont Township.

DeWitt jailer and hotel owner, John Bringle, furnished indigent families of volunteer’s $24.40 worth of beef. The claim was examined by the court and ordered paid.

The court sessions were presided over by A H Almond, John B Thetford and Y C Allen, who heard and approved 18 claims for assistance. Records for January also revealed over 100 citizens delinquent in state, county or war taxes. The cruel hand of war was taking Arkansas County into its grip.

Wintry blasts rampaged across the Ozark region but the men in McCulloch’s command would in later years remember the winter of 1861-62 as a time of rest and play, with military duties at a minimum.

More amusement followed as a heavy snow blanketed Camp Benjamin in Washington County. The encampment was named for Judah Phillip Benjamin, a former US Senator of English-Jewish parentage from New Orleans. He was now serving capably as the CS Secretary of War. Some of the Louisianans from Col Louis Hebert’s brigade provided even more amusement when other units noticed them witnessing their first snowfall.

By January 1st, 20000 soldiers had been recruited in Arkansas for Confederate service which was one-third of the voting population.

Much had to be done here, the poorest state in the Confederacy to make the military sustainable, while supplying civilian needs. By January, 1862, there were three locations where weapons were manufactured or repaired. A foundry at Camden was making cannon tubes and had sent a battery commanded by Captain John Reid to the battle of Wilson’s Creek or Oak Hills. The AR penitentiary was turning out artillery carriages to mount and transport the cannon. Also caissons (ammunitions carriers) and wagons were constructed by the inmates. The latter was an essential logistics vehicle, requiring a significant amount of steel and canvass. Their importance was similar to today’s military cargo trucks and required the same fuel, albeit only some of the latter run on a corn derivative.

The railroad machine shop at Hopefield (West Memphis) had been converted into an armory. Here old firearms were repaired or modified to get them ready for service.

Newspapers reported two foundries at Little Rock, one of which furnished grapeshot for the artillery service. An armory was maintained at the Arsenal, but the precision machinery for full operation had yet to arrive.

Lead mines were being worked in Newton and Sevier Counties. Also large deposits of saltpeter were being mined in Newton and Independence Counties, providing one of the necessary ingredients for gunpowder. One uncommon item was manufactured in Batesville—-matches.

Agricultural societies and newspapers were beginning to advise farmers to replace cotton acreage with grain and other food crops. Old habits are hard to break but between Magnolia and Washington, an unusual amount of wheat was planted, indicating some planters were taking the advice offered. No one could now guess the lower Arkansas River valley would become the breadbasket for the Confederate Army in the state. The cotton counties along that portion of the river really had no choice but to convert to corn.

Civilian needs were partially supplied where one or two cotton mills operated; one at Van Buren, the other on the Little Missouri River in Pike County. The latter was a large facility about three miles north of Murfreesboro and for days at a time long lines of encamped people waited for their turn to have their cotton and wool turned into yarn.

As the Federal blockade of Southern ports became tighter, cotton remained in warehouses while material shortages became worse. Suffering became progressively greater for women, children and older citizens. Worst of all the Mississippi had been closed for months, shutting off the supply from the North the simplest of manufactured goods such as needles, brooms and kitchen utensils. In manufacturing, the South was a colony of the North, like the US is to China today, with some dissimilarity.

During the sitting of the state convention which passed the ordinance of secession (May 6, 1861) authorization was given county courts to levy a one-fourth per cent tax on property for military and other purposes, also provisions were specified for the relief of families of volunteers. Commissioners were appointed for each township to purchase beef flour and other groceries to assist indigent families whose protectors were in the Army. Receipts for purchase were presented to the county courts for evaluation and approval. This system was something of a safety net and provided moral support for the public and military sector.

Three distinct flags were flown by the Confederate States of America during the course of the war which will be examined on a timeline basis.

The first flag comprised of a blue canton (corner division) of seven stars in a circle, one for each state then part of the Confederacy and three stripes. The top and bottom stripes were red, the middle one white. Congress adopted the flag on March 4, 1861. This banner was known as the stars and bars. It didn’t receive a high volume of popular acceptance because of its lack of distinctiveness.

The similarity to the U S flag led to confusion on the first Bull Run battlefield on July 21. Gen Pierre G. T. Beauregard submitted a standard of his own creation to Gen Joseph E Johnston for approval. It featured a blue St Andrew’s cross edged in white on a red field, with a star representing each Confederate state set in the cross. Johnston modified the flag from a rectangle to a square, varying the size for each arm of the military: 4ft by 4ft, infantry; 3ft by 3ft, artillery; and 2.5ft by 2.5ft cavalry. The War Department approved the design October 1, 1861, though congress never officially adopted the emblem. It was not only well received by the public then, but today it remains the most popular of Confederate icons. Only the rectangular shape originally designed by Gen Beauregard is now favored.

The Confederate Navy continued flying the Stars and Bars until May, 1863.